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Articles 
Preserving Justice:  A Discussion of 
Rhode Island’s “Raise or Waive” 
Doctrine 
Nicholas Nybo* 
“Preserving issues for appellate review is a fundamental 
component of appellate practice.”1  “It is well established that ‘the 
‘raise-or-waive rule’ precludes a litigant from arguing an issue on 
appeal that has not been articulated at trial.’”2  The rule’s benefits 
can hardly be denied: “Not only does the rule serve judicial 
economy by encouraging resolution of issues at the trial level, it 
also promotes fairer and more efficient trial proceedings by 
providing opposing counsel with an opportunity to respond 
appropriately to claims raised.”3  Furthermore, the raise or waive 
 
* Associate, Donoghue Barrett & Singal, P.C.; former law clerk in the 
Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New London.  J.D., Roger 
Williams University School of Law, 2013; B.B.A., Bryant University, 2010.  
To Alyse, for patiently enduring many Saturday mornings marred by the 
cacophonous combination of the keyboard and sports radio. A special thanks 
to the editors of the Roger Williams Law Review for their efforts in reviewing 
this Article.  All errors and opinions (legitimate or otherwise) belong to the 
author.  
 1.  Kennedy v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 564 S.E.2d 322, 323 (S.C. 2001) (quoting 
JEAN H. TOAL ET AL., APPELLATE PRACTICE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 65 (1999)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 2.  State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201, 1212 (R.I. 2012) (quoting State v. 
Brown, 9 A.3d 1240, 1245 (R.I. 2010)). 
 3.  State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1987).  Requiring arguments 
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rule is one of appellate resource conservation, allowing courts to 
limit the number of issues considered to those that have been 
properly developed in the trial record.  Nonetheless, there are 
consequences that result from strict enforcement of the raise or 
waive doctrine. 
Strict adherence to the appellate preservation doctrine 
prevents important issues from being decided, often punishing 
parties (novices to the justice system) for their trial attorney’s 
failure.4  “[T]his philosophy makes the availability of rights to 
individual citizens dependent on the skills of a particular attorney 
and the time that she has to devote to preparing for trial in any 
case.”5  The cost-benefit analysis underlying raise or waive was 
best discussed by Justice Hugo Black in 1941: 
Ordinarily an appellate court does not give consideration 
to issues not raised below.  For our procedural scheme 
contemplates that parties shall come to issue in the trial 
forum vested with authority to determine questions of 
fact.  This is essential in order that parties may have the 
opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant 
to the issues which the trial tribunal is alone competent 
to decide; it is equally essential in order that litigants 
may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of 
 
to be raised at the trial level allows the adverse party to make strategic 
litigation decisions: 
If the adverse party is aware of the objection the party can . . . urge 
that the action not be taken, an alternative be adopted, or make as 
complete a record as possible to support the action.  If no objection is 
made, the adverse party may think that the other party agrees with 
the action or for tactical reasons decides not to raise an objection. In 
either case the adverse party may fail to develop a record that would 
support the action taken or forgo taking some step that would avoid 
the alleged error. 
Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule 
and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
 4.   The use of the word failure is not intended as a qualitative criticism 
of trial attorneys who do not raise an issue at trial.  To expect a trial attorney 
to catch every arguably objectionable issue (and also articulate the precise 
defect) would be patently unreasonable.  An appellate attorney with the 
opportunity to carefully read the record and consult relevant case law is 
naturally in a far better position to identify and articulate potential error—
regardless of the respective quality and experience of the attorneys.   
 5.  Gideon’s Trumpet, Gideon: Appellate Decisions Diminish Stature of 
Judges, CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 17, 2014.  
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issues upon which they have had no opportunity to 
introduce evidence. . . . There may always be exceptional 
cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a 
reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might 
otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were 
neither pressed nor passed upon by the court . . .  Rules of 
practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of 
justice, not to defeat them.  A rigid and undeviating 
judicially declared practice under which courts of review 
would invariably and under all circumstances decline to 
consider all questions which had not previously been 
specifically urged would be out of harmony with this 
policy.  Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice 
of the rules of fundamental justice.6 
That same year, Roscoe Pound, celebrated legal commentator and 
former dean of Harvard Law School, criticized an overly 
restrictive approach to rules of appellate preservation.7  In 
Pound’s opinion, “appellate review in America focused on a search 
for error rather than a search for justice, which resulted in an 
overemphasis on the content of the record.”8  In fact, the American 
legal system would be without a number of its most revered 
principles had the United States Supreme Court rigorously 
adhered to the rule.  The Court’s decisions in Mapp v. Ohio 
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment),9 Washington v. Davis 
(reevaluating the equal protection standard for racial 
discrimination),10 and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (a choice of law 
landmark)11 all suffered from various preservation defects.12 
 
 6.  Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556–57 (1941).  
 7.  See Martineau, supra note 3, at 1028 (citing ROSCOE POUND, 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 107–10 (1941)).  
 8.  Id. (citing POUND, supra note 7, at 318–20). 
 9.  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 10.  426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 11.  304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 12.   Specifically, those preservation defects have been catalogued as 
such: 
[S]ome of the Supreme Court’s most famous opinions decided issues 
not presented by the briefs or addressed below.  In Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, the Court overturned sua sponte an ancient precedent on 
applying the common law in diversity cases.  Mapp v. Ohio overrules 
a prior case and applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to 
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Yet and still, the aforementioned benefits of raise or waive 
have encouraged courts in every state to adopt some version of the 
rule.13  Moreover, the rule enjoys particular importance in the 
 
the states, without briefing or argument on the issue.  In 
Washington v. Davis, the Court decided that Title VII standards did 
not apply to constitutional discrimination, even though the parties 
had agreed that they did.  Younger v. Harris prohibits injunctions 
against pending state court criminal cases, even though the issue 
was not argued on appeal.  Indeed, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Court 
held that due process requires hearings and an opportunity to make 
submissions before a state can terminate the parental rights of 
unwed fathers.  But the Court decided this without briefing or 
argument—without a hearing on the issue or an opportunity for the 
parties to make submissions. 
Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings, When Courts Deprive 
Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1255–56 
(2002) (footnotes omitted).  Furthermore, in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 
the Court reversed the petitioner’s disorderly conduct conviction based on a 
speech he gave in Chicago on behalf of the Christian Veterans of America.  
337 U.S. 1, 2 (1949).  Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented as follows: 
The impropriety of . . . the charge which is now made the basis of 
reversal was not raised at the trial nor before the Appellate Court of 
Illinois. . . . Thus an objection, not raised by counsel in the Illinois 
courts, not made the basis of the petition for certiorari here—not 
included in the “questions presented,” nor in the “reasons relied on 
for the allowance of the writ”—and explicitly disavowed at the bar of 
this Court, is used to upset a conviction which has been sustained by 
three courts of Illinois. 
Id. at 9 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  The majority opinion in Terminiello, 
authored by Justice William O. Douglas, rejected the trial court’s jury 
instruction broadly defining “breach of peace,” which the Court found violated 
the First Amendment.  Id. at 4–6 (majority opinion).  As an interesting (albeit 
exceedingly tangential) aside, Justice Robert Jackson’s dissent in the case 
contains the only citation to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf that can currently be 
found in the U.S. Reports.  Id. at 23–24 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also 
NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES & TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 328 (2010).  
 13.  Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d 539, 546 (Ala. 2004) (Brown, J., 
dissenting); Still v. Cunningham, 94 P.3d 1104, 1111 (Alaska 2004); State v. 
Tyszkiewicz, 104 P.3d 188, 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Leach v. State, 402 
S.W.3d 517, 528 (Ark. 2012); People v. Bonilla, 160 P.3d 84, 99–100 (Cal. 
2007); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 831 (Colo. 
1993); Bell Atl. Mobile Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 754 A.2d 128, 146–
47 (Conn. 2000); Nance v. State, 903 A.2d 283, 285 (Del. 2006); Hodges v. 
State, 885 So. 2d 338, 358 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Smith v. State, 695 S.E.2d 
679, 681 & n.3 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Honolulu Univ. of Arts, 135 P.3d 
113, 127 (Haw. 2006); Jones v. Crawforth, 205 P.3d 660, 668–69 (Idaho 2009); 
People v. Kitch, 942 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (Ill. 2011); Ingram v. State, 718 
N.E.2d 379, 382 n.5 (Ind. 1999); Duck Creek Tire Serv., Inc. v. Goodyear 
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Ocean State.  Between January 1, 2010 and January 1, 2014, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on the rule in refusing to 
decide the merits of an issue in fifty-three cases.14  That number 
 
Corners, 796 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Iowa 2011); State v. Bailey, 255 P.3d 19, 27 
(Kan. 2011); Cain v. Lodestar Energy, 302 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Ky. 2009); State v. 
Johnson, 860 So. 2d 180, 187–88 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Butler v. Killoran, 714 
A.2d 129, 134 n.9 (Me. 1998); Hobby v. State, 83 A.3d 794, 802–03 (Md. 2014); 
Commonwealth v. Bowler, 553 N.E.2d 534, 534 (Mass. 1990); Admire v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 831 N.W.2d 849, 851 n.5 (Mich. 2013); State v. Maurstad, 
733 N.W.2d 141, 153 (Minn. 2007) (en banc) (Gildea, J., dissenting); Walker 
v. State, 913 So. 2d 198, 217 (Miss. 2005) (en banc); Vance Bros. v. Obermiller 
Constr. Serv., 181 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Mo. 2006); State v. Johnson, 265 P.3d 
638, 642 (Mont. 2011); Paulsen v. State, 541 N.W.2d 636, 645 (Neb. 1996); 
Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 623 P.2d 981, 983–84 (Nev. 1981); State v. 
Brooks, 34 A.3d 643, 654 (N.H. 2011); State v. Robinson, 974 A.2d 1057, 1068 
(N.J. 2009); Juneau v. Intel Corp., 127 P.3d 548, 552 (N.M. 2005); People v. 
Cona, 399 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Chapman, 611 S.E.2d 794, 
822–23 (N.C. 2005); Coughlin Const. Co., Inc. v. Nu-Tec Indus., Inc., 755 
N.W.2d 867, 871 (N.D. 2008); State v. Peagler, 668 N.E.2d 489, 492 (Ohio 
1996); Miller v. State, 313 P.3d 934, 971 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013); Barcik v. 
Kubiaczyk, 895 P.2d 765, 781 n.12 (Or. 1995) (en banc); Harman ex. rel. 
Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1124–25 (Pa. 2000); Martin v. Lawrence, 79 
A.3d 1275, 1282 (R.I. 2013); Foster v. Foster, 711 S.E.2d 878, 880 (S.C. 2011); 
State v. Wright, 768 N.W.2d 512, 534 (S.D. 2009); Spicer v. State, 12 S.W.3d 
438, 444 n.7 (Tenn. 2000); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 
611 (Tex. 2012); Rapela v. Green, 289 P.3d 428, 436 (Utah 2012); State v. 
Sharrow, 949 A.2d 428, 436–37 (Vt. 2008); Lee v. Lee, 404 S.E.2d 736, 737 & 
n.1 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc); State v. McFarland, 899 P.2d 1251, 1255–
56 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); State v. Legg, 625 S.E.2d 281, 291 (W. Va. 2005); 
State v. Rogers, 539 N.W.2d 897, 900–01 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); Moore v. 
Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 267 (Wyo. 1991).  
 14.  Martin, 79 A.3d at 1282; State v. Whitaker, 79 A.3d 795, 808 (R.I. 
2013); Johnson v. QBAR Assocs., 78 A.3d 48, 54 (R.I. 2013); Greensleeves, 
Inc. v. Smiley, 68 A.3d 425, 438–39 (R.I. 2013); State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 
468–69 (R.I. 2013); State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1238, 1243 (R.I. 2013); 
Berard v. HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219 & n.2 (R.I. 2013); State v. Price, 66 
A.3d 406, 416–17 (R.I. 2013); State v. Botas, 71 A.3d 430, 434 (R.I. 2013); 
Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069, 1081 n.10, 1082–83  (R.I. 
2013); Peloquin v. Haven Health Ctr. of Greenville, LLC, 61 A.3d 419, 430–31 
(R.I. 2013); Swain v. Estate of Tyre ex rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283, 288 n.13 (R.I. 
2012); State v. Ford, 56 A.3d 463, 470 (R.I. 2012); Rodriguez v. Virgilio, 58 
A.3d 914, 915 n.3 (R.I. 2012); State v. Bellem, 56 A.3d 432, 433 n.2 (R.I. 
2012); State v. Tep, 56 A.3d 942, 945 n.10 (R.I. 2012); State v. Kluth, 46 A.3d 
867, 875–76 (R.I. 2012); State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 83–84 (R.I. 2012); 
McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 282 (R.I. 2012); State v. Cook, 45 A.3d 1272, 
1279–80 (R.I. 2012); State v. Viveiros, 45 A.3d 1232, 1243–44 (R.I. 2012); 
Iozzi v. Cranston, 52 A.3d 585, 590 (R.I. 2012); State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201, 
1212–13 (R.I. 2012); Town Houses at Bonnet Shores Condo. Ass’n v. Langlois, 
45 A.3d 577, 584 (R.I. 2012); State v. Alston, 47 A.3d 234, 242–43 (R.I. 2012); 
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represents roughly ten percent of the total cases decided by the 
court during that time.  However, such reliance is certainly 
justified.  The state is one of only ten without an intermediate 
appellate court,15 and its five appellate justices are tied with six 
other states for least in the country.16  By way of local comparison, 
Connecticut has seventeen appellate justices, one of which is on 
senior status,17 while Massachusetts has thirty-one.18  Of course, 
 
Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 1259–60 (R.I. 2012); Robideau v. Cosentino, 47 
A.3d 338, 341 (R.I. 2012); Krivitsky v. Krivitsky, 43 A.3d 23, 32 (R.I. 2012); 
State v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 8–9 (R.I. 2012); State v. Vieira, 38 A.3d 18, 25 (R.I. 
2012); State v. Lyons, 37 A.3d 118, 118 n.1 (R.I. 2012); State v. Delestre, 35 
A.3d 886, 892 n.6 (R.I. 2012); In re Jazlyn P., 31 A.3d 1273, 1280–81 (R.I. 
2011); State v. Karngar, 29 A.3d 1232, 1235–36 (R.I. 2011); DeMarco v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585, 628–29 (R.I. 2011); Randall v. Randall, 22 
A.3d 1166, 1172 (R.I. 2011); In re Quigley, 21 A.3d 393, 401 (R.I. 2011); 
Dawkins v. Siwicki, 22 A.3d 1142, 1150 (R.I. 2011); State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 
302, 308–09 (R.I. 2011); State v. Kelly, 20 A.3d 655, 660–61 (R.I. 2011); State 
v. Kizekai, 19 A.3d 583, 591 n.11 (R.I. 2011); State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 
524 (R.I. 2011); Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 473–74 (R.I. 2011); State v. 
Brown, 9 A.3d 1240, 1246 (R.I. 2010); State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 441 (R.I. 
2010); State v. Storey, 8 A.3d 454, 465–66 (R.I. 2010); State v. Moreno, 996 
A.2d 673, 684 (R.I. 2010); Vanderheiden v. Marandola, 994 A.2d 74, 78 (R.I. 
2010); State v. McManus, 990 A.2d 1229, 1237 (R.I. 2010); In re Miguel A., 
990 A.2d 1216, 1223 (R.I. 2010); State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 479 (R.I. 
2010); Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. E. Providence, 989 A.2d 106, 109–10 
(R.I. 2010); Classic Entm’t & Sports, Inc. v. Pemberton, 988 A.2d 847, 849 n.4 
(R.I. 2010).  
 15.  COUNCIL OF CHIEF JUDGES OF THE STATE COURTS OF APPEAL, THE ROLE 
OF STATE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: PRINCIPLES FOR ADAPTING TO 
CHANGE 2–3 & illus. 1 (2012), available at http://www.sji.gov/PDF/ 
Report_5_CCJSCA_Report.pdf. 
 16.  The other six states with only five appellate justices are: Delaware, 
New Hampshire, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  
Judicial Officers of the Delaware Supreme Court, DEL. ST. CTS., 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Supreme/justices.stm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); 
Supreme Court – Meet the Justices, N.H. JUD. BRANCH, http://www. 
courts.state.nh.us/supreme/justices.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); South 
Dakota Supreme Court, S.D. UNIFIED JUD. SYS., http://ujs.sd.gov/ 
Supreme_Court/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Vermont Supreme 
Court Justices’ Biographies, VT. JUDICIARY, https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/ 
GTC/Supreme/Justicesbios.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Justices & Staff, 
W. VA. JUDICIARY, http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/justices-staff.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Wyoming Supreme Court, Meet the Justices, WYO. 
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.wy.us/WSC (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
 17.   Connecticut has eight supreme court justices and nine appellate 
court judges.  Connecticut Supreme Court Justices, ST. OF CONN. JUD. 
BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/supjustices.htm (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2015); Connecticut Appellate Court Judges, ST. OF CONN. JUD. 
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each additional justice results in an exponential increase in 
judicial resources given that an appellate justice often enjoys at 
least two law clerks as well as other research services.  Finally, of 
the ten states without an intermediate appellate court, Rhode 
Island has the fourth highest population per appellate justice.19  
In Rhode Island, there are 210,058 residents per appellate 
justice.20  In a country where judicial resources are in short 
supply, Rhode Island is paradigmatic. 
In light of raise or waive’s competing interests, as well as the 
rule’s continued prevalence in Rhode Island, a discussion of the 
rule’s history and future is warranted.  Part I of this Article will 
revisit the historical development of both the rule and its narrow 
exception in the state.  Part II will discuss State v. Moten,21 a 2013 
Rhode Island Supreme Court decision representing (in this 
author’s humble opinion) an excessively restrictive approach to 
the doctrine.  Finally, Part III will explore other possible 
approaches to appellate preservation.  The Article does not 
advocate the abolition of the raise or waive doctrine.  To allow the 
talented appellate bar in Rhode Island to treat the trial record as 
a first year torts exam, freely combing the transcript and spotting 
issues for the court’s consideration, would wreak havoc on the 
administration of appellate justice. 
The Article will, however, seek clarification of the rule (and, 
more specifically, its increasingly vague exception) to foster a 
more crisp understanding of when the court will and will not 
 
BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/appjudge.html (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2015). 
 18.  Massachusetts has seven justices on its Supreme Judicial Court and 
twenty-four appeals court justices.  Supreme Judicial Court Justices, MASS. 
CRT. SYS., http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/sjc/about/sjc-justices/ (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2015); Appeals Court Justices, MASS. CRT. SYS., http://www. 
mass.gov/courts/court-info/appealscourt/appeals-court-justices/ (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2015). 
 19.  Based on 2012 state population census estimates, Rhode Island has 
210,058 residents per appellate justice while Nevada has 394,133 residents 
per appellate justice, New Hampshire has 264,144 residents per appellate 
justice, and West Virginia has 371,083 residents per appellate justice.  2012 
State Population Census Estimates, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/ 
gov-data/state-census-population-migration-births-deaths-estimates.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  64 A.3d 1232 (R.I. 2013).   
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consider the merits of an unpreserved, substantive argument.  
Such clarification should allow appellants to voluntarily abandon 
certain unpreserved arguments at an early stage, thus sparing 
resources in researching and briefing the merits of that particular 
argument.  Of course, if the appellant abandons an issue, the 
opposing party can ignore both the potential preservation defects 
as well as the merits of the substantive argument—thereby 
conserving its resources.  And finally, if the argument is never 
raised, the appellate court need not take time to justify its 
decision whether to decide the merits.  Ultimately, clarification 
should yield efficiency returns at all levels of appellate practice. 
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF “RAISE OR WAIVE”                      
AND ITS NARROW EXCEPTION 
Rhode Island’s raise or waive rule experienced a fairly 
unremarkable debut.22  The appeal in Denison v. Foster arose 
from an action for trespass and ejectment.23  At trial, the court 
granted the defendant’s motion for dismissal after the plaintiffs 
 
 22.  The rule’s original conception, however, occurred overseas with 
England’s writ of error procedure: 
Under the writ of error review procedure the only issues that could 
be presented to the appellate court were those that had been raised 
and decided in the trial court.  The entire purpose of the proceeding 
was to test the correctness of the judge’s actions.  The purpose was 
not to test whether the proper party had won, but only whether the 
judge had made an error. . . . [T]he appellate court could not rule on 
any question not reflected in the record because the record was the 
only way to determine the basis of the judge’s ruling.  At the time, 
the record consisted only of formal documents filed in court and the 
official record of the actions of the jury and the judge.  Because there 
was no way to record verbatim what occurred at trial, a procedure 
developed whereby a party could challenge a court’s action that 
otherwise would not be reflected in the record . . .  Under this 
procedure, a party could ask the judge or a third party to record in 
writing the action or inaction of the judge and the fact that the party 
took exception to the judge’s ruling.  This became known as the bill 
of exceptions and was sent to the appellate court along with the 
record.  In effect, the bill of exceptions was the complaint against the 
trial judge.  Thus, a matter had to be presented to and ruled on by 
the trial judge before the issue could be raised in the appellate court, 
both because of the nature of the writ of error procedure and the 
practicalities of recording the lower court proceeding. 
Martineau, supra note 3, at 1026–27. 
 23.  31 A. 894, 894 (R.I. 1894).  
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presented their testimony.24  The plaintiffs appealed arguing, 
among other errors, that their right to a full and fair trial had 
been violated because they were “forced to trial in a hasty and 
discourteous manner, [and] that they were not prepared for 
trial.”25  Late Rhode Island Supreme Court Chief Justice Pardon 
E. Tillinghast responded that “[t]he statement of evidence 
submitted with the papers in the case not having been presented 
to or allowed by the justice presiding at the trial . . . forms no part 
of the record, and we cannot, therefore, consider the same.”26  
While the court stated that it would not consider the claim since it 
had not been presented to the trial court, it also recognized that 
the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to show any sufficient reason for not being 
ready for trial” but merely relied on “bald assertions” and “general 
statements.”27  The court denied and dismissed the petition for 
new trial.28 
In the subsequent 120 years, the rule has thusly evolved.  
Appellate issues must be “preserved at trial by a specific objection, 
sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice’s attention to the 
basis for said objection.”29  Accordingly, “a litigant cannot raise an 
objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised 
before the trial court.”30  The court, nevertheless, “has declined to 
lock the door in an unequivocal manner and has recognized the 
existence of a narrow exception to the ‘axiomatic’ raise or waive 
rule.”31  That exception applies when “basic constitutional rights 
are concerned,” but “the alleged error must be more than 
harmless, and the exception must implicate an issue of 
constitutional dimension derived from a novel rule of law that 
could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of 
 
 24.  Id. at 894–95. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. at 895.  At the time of the opinion, Justice Tillinghast was not the 
Chief Justice; however, he would serve in that position from 1904 until his 
death in 1905.  See Chief Justice Tillinghast Expires of Pneumonia—His 
Career, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 1905), available at http://query.nytimes.com/ 
mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B0CE5D7163DE733A25753C1A9649C946497D6
CF. 
 27.  Denison, 31 A. at 895. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  State v. Warren, 624 A.2d 841, 842 (R.I. 1993).  
 30.  State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 829 (R.I. 2008). 
 31.  Pollard v. Acer Grp., 870 A.2d 429, 432 n.10 (R.I. 2005).  
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trial.”32 
This narrow exception derives from two cases decided in 1965, 
State v. Dufour and State v. Mendes.33  These appeals arose from 
criminal trials that occurred before June 22, 1964, the day that 
the United States Supreme Court decided Escobedo v. Illinois.34  
In Escobedo—an extension of Gideon v. Wainwright35 and a 
precursor to Miranda v. Arizona36—the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment required the police to inform a criminal defendant of 
his right to counsel and his right to remain silent once the 
investigation had matured from a “general inquiry” to an 
investigation focused on the defendant.37  In Dufour, the 
defendant was suspected of possessing pornographic films and 
agreed to go to the police station and discuss the investigation 
when confronted by police officers.38  During that discussion, the 
defendant confessed that he was, in fact, the owner of the films.39  
At no point did the defendant ask for counsel nor did the officers 
advise the defendant of his right to counsel.40  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court recognized that the defendant had neither briefed 
nor argued at oral argument that the confession was invalid.41  
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the police had violated the 
defendant’s rights under Escobedo, and the confession was 
suppressed.42  Justice Joslin, in concurrence, emphasized that 
“[w]hen we are satisfied that a defendant’s constitutional rights 
have been violated in this manner in a criminal case, we are not 
justified in sanctioning those violations because of the defendant’s 
failure to observe procedural technicalities.”43 
Five months later, the court decided State v. Mendes, an 
 
 32.  State v. DeOliveira, 972 A.2d 653, 660 n.6 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State 
v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 33.  State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1965); State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 
82 (R.I. 1965).  
 34.  378 U.S. 478 (1964).  
 35.  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 36.  384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
 37.  378 U.S. at 490–91.  
 38.  206 A.2d at 83–84. 
 39.  Id. at 84. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. at 85.  The defendant instead argued that his arrest was not 
supported by probable cause.  Id.  
 42.  Id. at 86.  
 43.  Id. at 88 (Joslin, J., concurring).  
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appeal from a conviction for driving to endanger resulting in 
death.44  After a night of drinking, the defendant struck the victim 
with his vehicle and killed her.45  The defendant was taken into 
custody, where tests revealed his level of intoxication, and he was 
subsequently held overnight.46  The next morning, the defendant 
was told that the victim had died, and during the subsequent 
interrogation, the defendant made numerous incriminating 
statements.47  Like in Dufour, the officers failed to advise the 
defendant of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel.48  At 
trial, the defendant’s statement was introduced into evidence, and 
the defendant’s counsel conceded in open court that he had no 
objection to the introduction of the statement.49  In fact, the 
defense counsel used the statement to cross-examine the police 
officers.50  The majority in Mendes, however, excused the 
defendant’s failure to raise the objection at trial, “[b]ecause 
defendant’s contentions have merit, we do not believe we should 
compel him to seek post-conviction relief . . . The defendant has 
been denied due process and the conviction cannot stand.”51  The 
majority determined that the defendant’s statement violated the 
principles in Escobedo and remanded the case to the superior 
court for retrial.52 
Justice Joslin dissented in Mendes because, among other 
reasons, he felt that the defense counsel had waived the issue on 
appeal given that counsel (unlike the defense counsel in Dufour) 
had intentionally refused to object to the introduction of the 
statement.53  “As part of his trial tactics, deliberately adopted, 
[defense counsel] intentionally bypassed [the contemporaneous 
objection] requirement.  By that conduct defendant forfeited his 
right to assert on review that the admission of the statement 
 
 44.  State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50, 52 (R.I. 1965).  
 45.  Id. at 53. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. at 54. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 57–58 (Joslin, J., dissenting).  
 51.  Id. at 56 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82, 88 
(R.I. 1965) (Joslin, J., concurring)).  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. at 57–58 (Joslin, J., dissenting).  
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violated his federal constitutional rights.”54  Justice Joslin further 
emphasized the importance of defense counsel’s intentional use of 
the statement: 
I add, however, to what I have said that my opinion 
would be otherwise if the requirement of 
contemporaneous objection were a procedural technicality 
having no rational relationship to a well ordered trial. If 
such were the case, I would not insist, nor would I have 
any right to on compliance at the expense of ignoring a 
defendant’s constitutional rights. . . . When such a 
procedure is intentionally disregarded by competent trial 
counsel, in my judgment the constitutional right, which 
might have been brought into issue by compliance, is 
waived.55 
The exception for novel constitutional issues has developed since 
1965; however, appellants who have claimed the exception over 
the years have not enjoyed much success.  In the past twenty-five 
years, the court has rejected litigants’ attempts to satisfy the 
exception in at least fifty-seven cases.56  A most recent example 
 
 54.  Id. at 58.  
 55.  Id. at 59 (citations omitted). 
 56.  State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1241 (R.I. 2013); State v. Kluth, 46 
A.3d 867, 876 n.14 (R.I. 2012); State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 83–84 (R.I. 2012); 
State v. Alston, 47 A.3d 234, 243 n.16 (R.I. 2012); State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 
1283, 1289 n.7 (R.I. 2011); State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302, 308 n.13 (R.I. 2011); 
Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2011); State v. Brown, 9 A.3d 1240, 
1246 (R.I. 2010); In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d 1216, 1223 (R.I. 2010); State v. 
DeOliveira, 972 A.2d 653, 660 n.6 (R.I. 2009); State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228, 
236 n.16 (R.I. 2008); State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 312 (R.I. 2008); State v. 
Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 829–30 (R.I. 2008); State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 841 
(R.I. 2008); State v. Young, 941 A.2d 124, 128 (R.I. 2008); State v. Ramirez, 
936 A.2d 1254, 1262 (R.I. 2007); Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 428 
(R.I. 2007); State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 647 (R.I. 2006); State v. Gomes, 
881 A.2d 97, 113 n.27 (R.I. 2005); Lyons v. State, 880 A.2d 839, 841 n.4 (R.I. 
2005); State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 1126 n.15 (R.I. 2005); State v. 
Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 810 (R.I. 2005); State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 
1018 (R.I. 2005); State v. Crow, 871 A.2d 930, 936 n.7 (R.I. 2005); Pollard v. 
Acer Grp., 870 A.2d 429, 432 n.10 (R.I. 2005); State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787, 
797 (R.I. 2004); In re Ephraim L., 862 A.2d 196, 201 (R.I. 2004); State v. 
Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1040 (R.I. 2004); Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116, 1122 
(R.I. 2004); State v. Portes, 840 A.2d 1131, 1141–42 (R.I. 2004); State v. 
Rivera, 839 A.2d 497, 501 n.5 (R.I. 2003); State v. Silva, 798 A.2d 419, 428 
(R.I. 2002); State v. Kaba, 798 A.2d 383, 388 (R.I. 2002); Roe v. Gelineau, 794 
A.2d 476, 482 (R.I. 2002); Harvey Realty v. Killingly Manor Condo. Ass’n, 787 
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was the court’s decision in State v. Moten.57 
II. STATE V. MOTEN & THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT 
Rigorous adherence to the rules of appellate preservation is 
particularly justified for certain substantive issues.  Evidentiary 
rulings, for example, often invoke principles (such as conditional 
relevance and undue prejudice) that are intrinsically intertwined 
with and must be evaluated in the context of the trial.  In a 
vacuum—without the benefit of counsels’ arguments and the trial 
court’s ruling on those arguments—it would be difficult for 
appellate justices to review an evidentiary issue with only the 
benefit of the “cold record.”58  From January 1, 2010 to January 1, 
2014, of the fifty-three cases wherein the court denied review of an 
issue pursuant to raise or waive, about one third (sixteen cases) 
involved evidentiary issues.59  Moreover, Rule 30 of the Superior 
 
A.2d 465, 467 (R.I. 2001); State v. Hazard, 785 A.2d 1111, 1116 (R.I. 2001); 
Cronan ex. rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 878 (R.I. 2001); State v. Breen, 
767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001); State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377, 390 n.16 (R.I. 
2001); State v. Rieger, 763 A.2d 997, 1004 (R.I. 2001); State v. Addison, 748 
A.2d 814, 820 n.1 (R.I. 2000); In re David G., 741 A.2d 863, 866 (R.I. 1999); 
State v. Brezinski, 731 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 1999); State v. Vanover, 721 A.2d 
430, 437 (R.I. 1998); State v. Brown, 709 A.2d 465, 479 (R.I. 1998); State v. 
Rivera, 706 A.2d 914, 920 (R.I. 1997); State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 319 (R.I. 
1997); State v. Leonardo, 677 A.2d 1336, 1337 (R.I. 1996); State v. Figueroa, 
673 A.2d 1084, 1092 (R.I. 1996); State v. Grabowski, 672 A.2d 879, 882 (R.I. 
1996); State v. Mastracchio, 672 A.2d 438, 446 (R.I. 1996); State v. Thomas, 
654 A.2d 327, 332 (R.I. 1995); State v. Froais, 653 A.2d 735, 739 (R.I. 1995); 
State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1015–16 (R.I. 1994); State v. Cardoza, 649 
A.2d 745, 748 (R.I. 1994); State v. Sanden, 626 A.2d 194, 199 (R.I. 1993); 
State v. Donato, 592 A.2d 140, 142 (R.I 1991).   
 57.  64 A.3d at 1241. 
 58.  The court has most often used the “cold record” language in the 
context of reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial.  See, 
e.g., State v. Whitaker, 79 A.3d 795, 804 (R.I. 2013); State v. Erminelli, 991 
A.2d 1064, 1069 (R.I. 2010).   
It is well-established that we accord a great deal of respect to the 
factual determinations and credibility assessments made by the 
judicial officer who has actually observed the human drama that is 
part and parcel of every trial and who has had an opportunity to 
appraise witness demeanor and to take into account other realities 
that cannot be grasped from a reading of a cold record. 
Erminelli, 991 A.2d at 1069 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 986 A.2d 235, 242 
(R.I. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This logic can also apply to 
evidentiary rulings based on relevance, prejudice, or bias.   
 59.  Martin v. Lawrence, 79 A.3d 1275, 1282 (R.I. 2013); State v. Pona, 66 
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Court Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically mandates the 
preservation of objections to jury instructions.60  During the above 
stated time period, the court denied review of unpreserved 
arguments related to jury instructions in five cases.61  
Nevertheless, there remain thirty-two other cases where the court 
rejected a wide variety of issues including criminal joinder,62 
adequacy of tax sale notice,63 and the removal of probate funds.64  
Certainly, the court properly invoked raise or waive in the great 
majority of these cases; however at least one warrants further 
discussion. 
In May of 2013, the Rhode Island Supreme Court released its 
opinion in State v. Moten, affirming the appellant’s first-degree 
child abuse conviction.65  The sole issue on appeal involved the 
testimony of Dr. Nancy Harper, a pediatrician who examined the 
child’s injuries.66  During the doctor’s testimony, she was asked 
about statements made to her by a colleague (an ophthalmologist) 
who had examined the child’s eyes.67  The defense counsel 
objected, and the trial justice sustained the objection.68  The 
prosecutor then asked Dr. Harper whether the ophthalmologist’s 
 
A.3d 454, 469 (R.I. 2013); State v. Ford, 56 A.3d 463, 470 (R.I. 2012); State v. 
Bellem, 56 A.3d 432, 433 n.2 (R.I. 2012); State v. Tep, 56 A.3d 942, 945 n.10 
(R.I. 2012); State v. Cook, 45 A.3d 1272, 1280 (R.I. 2012); State v. Ciresi, 45 
A.3d 1201, 1212–13 (R.I. 2012); Alston, 47 A.3d at 243; Robideau v. 
Cosentino, 47 A.3d 338, 341 (R.I. 2012); In re Jazlyn P., 31 A.3d 1273, 1280–
81 (R.I. 2011); State v. Kelly, 20 A.3d 655, 660–61 (R.I. 2011); Brown, 9 A.3d 
at 1246; State v. Moreno, 996 A.2d 673, 684 (R.I. 2010); State v. McManus, 
990 A.2d 1229, 1237 (R.I. 2010); In re Miguel, 990 A.2d at 1223; State v. 
Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 479 (R.I. 2010).  
 60.  Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, 
in relevant part: “No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or 
omission therefrom unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects 
and the grounds of the party’s objection.”  R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 30.   
 61.  Whitaker, 79 A.3d at 808; State v. Botas, 71 A.3d 430, 434 (R.I. 
2013); State v. Viveiros, 45 A.3d 1232, 1243–44 (R.I. 2012); State v. Delestre, 
35 A.3d 886, 892 n.6 (R.I. 2012); Dawkins v. Siwicki, 22 A.3d 1142, 1150 (R.I. 
2011). 
 62.  State v. Kluth, 46 A.3d 867, 875–76 (2012). 
 63.  Johnson v. QBAR Assocs., 78 A.3d 48, 54 (2013).  
 64.  Randall v. Randall, 22 A.3d 1166, 1172 (2011).  
 65.  64 A.3d 1232, 1234 (R.I. 2013). 
 66.  Id. at 1235. 
 67.  Id. at 1236–37.  
 68.  Id. at 1236. 
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statements were necessary for Dr. Harper’s complete assessment 
of the child, and the doctor answered in the affirmative.69  The 
prosecutor asked again about the ophthalmologist’s statements, 
and the defense counsel again objected; however the trial justice 
overruled the objection.70  Dr. Harper testified about the 
ophthalmologist’s statements  regarding the extensive injuries 
suffered by the child.71  The defendant was convicted of first-
degree child abuse and given a twenty-year prison sentence.72 
On appeal, the defendant’s only argument was that Dr. 
Harper’s testimony violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause.73  While the trial counsel did repeatedly object to Dr. 
Harper’s testimony, counsel never specifically referenced the 
Confrontation Clause.74  Justice Robinson, writing for the 
majority, began by emphasizing that the court’s raise or waive 
rule “is not some sort of artificial or arbitrary Kafkaesque hurdle.  
Instead, the rule serves as an important guarantor of fairness and 
efficiency in the judicial process.”75  The majority proceeded to 
recognize that the trial counsel had made a general objection to 
Dr. Harper’s testimony, but had not articulated the specific basis 
for that objection.76  The defendant maintained that it was clear 
that the trial counsel’s objection was based on the Confrontation 
Clause; however, the majority disagreed: “In our view . . . it is 
equally—if not more—plausible that the prosecutor and the trial 
justice understood defendant’s objection to be on hearsay 
 
 69.  Id. at 1236–37. 
 70.  Id. at 1237.  That exchange proceeded as follows: 
Q: And did you need [the ophthalmologist’s statements] to further 
your information for the treatment of [the child], as well as the 
diagnosis? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what did he tell you. 
DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY: Objection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71.  Id.   
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. at 1239. 
 75.  Id. at 1238 (quoting DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585, 628 
n.55 (R.I. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76.  Id. at 1239. 
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grounds.”77  In support of this conclusion, Justice Robinson cited 
an earlier objection levied by defense counsel to the introduction of 
similar out of court statements made by an emergency room 
technician.78  In that instance, there was a sidebar during which 
the attorneys and trial justice discussed Rule 803(4) of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence, which creates a hearsay exception for 
out of court statements made for the purposes of medical 
treatment.79  The majority relied upon this and other 
circumstantial evidence of the trial counsel’s intent to propound a 
hearsay objection to Harper’s testimony and declined to further 
embark upon a “journey into the mind of defense counsel, the 
prosecutor, or the trial justice,” which the court characterized as 
“a fruitless effort that brings to the fore the very purpose of the 
‘raise or waive’ rule.”80  The court then moved on to discuss the 
narrow exception for novel constitutional issues.81 
The majority began its discussion of the exception by warning 
that “the alleged error must be more than harmless, and the 
exception must implicate an issue of constitutional dimension 
derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have 
been known to counsel at the time of trial.”82  The defendant’s 
argument focused on the reformulated Confrontation Clause 
analysis first announced in Crawford v. Washington, decided on 
March 8, 2004.83  In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court, 
abandoning the framework established in Ohio v. Roberts,84 stated 
that the admission of an out of court, “testimonial” statement 
violates the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause unless the 
declarant is determined to be “unavailable” and the defendant had 
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.85 
While the defendant did not specifically rely on Crawford, the 
majority stated that such reliance would have been frivolous given 
that the decision was published more than two and a half years 
 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id. at 1240. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. (quoting State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 83.  Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).  
 84.  448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  
 85.  Moten, 64 A.3d at 1241 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).  
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before Dr. Harper’s testimony at trial.86  The defendant instead 
relied upon two more recent United States Supreme Court 
decisions in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts87 and Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico,88 which, the defendant argued, constituted 
“intervening decisions” establishing a novel constitutional rule.89  
The majority rejected the argument: “Both Bullcoming and 
Melendez-Diaz merely apply the rule announced in Crawford.  
Therefore, those cases cannot be considered to have established a 
‘novel constitutional rule.’”90  The defendant desperately 
attempted to avoid the dreaded result by arguing that Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming had extended the rule in Crawford from 
mere witness statements to neutral, scientific evidence that had 
not previously been considered to violate the Confrontation 
Clause.91  The testimonial statements in Crawford were made by 
the victim to the police, whereas the testimonial statements in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming consisted of lab results.92  The 
defendant asserted that the ophthalmologist’s statements were 
neutral, scientific evidence covered by Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, both decided after the defendant’s trial.93  Justice 
Robinson remained unconvinced: 
The “narrow exception” to the “raise or waive” rule 
applies to novel constitutional rules. It is not available 
when the Supreme Court applies a familiar constitutional 
rule to a novel fact pattern. If that were the standard, 
then virtually every constitutional decision of the 
Supreme Court would provide defendants an opportunity 
to take advantage of the exception. There would be 
nothing “narrow” about such an outcome, nor would that 
outcome further the rule’s purpose of “fairness and 
efficiency in the judicial process.”94 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 88.  131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  
 89.  Moten, 64 A.3d at 1241. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id. at 1242. 
 92.  Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004), with 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307, and Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712. 
 93.  Moten, 64 A.3d at 1242. 
 94.  Id. at 1243. 
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With that, the majority affirmed the defendant’s conviction.95 
“Hindsight is always twenty-twenty—especially when 
afforded the benefit of almost seven years of clarifying United 
States Supreme Court jurisprudence.”96  Thus began the 
dissenting opinion in Moten authored by Justices Flaherty and 
Indeglia.  The two justices began by concurring with the majority’s 
affirmance of the conviction—given that the ophthalmologist’s 
statements were not testimonial—yet expressed concern over the 
majority’s narrowing of the raise or waive exception.97  The 
dissent emphasized the United States Supreme Court’s disclaimer 
in Crawford:  “[W]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”98  The dissent 
continued to stress the ongoing development in this area of 
criminal procedure: 
It was not until approximately three-and-one-half years 
after Moten’s trial, which took place in 2006, that the 
United States Supreme Court moved beyond the realm of 
interrogation and considered whether forensic analyses—
statements much more akin to the ophthalmologist’s out-
of-court statements made to Dr. Harper—were 
testimonial in nature and, thus, subject to exclusion 
under the Confrontation Clause.99 
Justices Flaherty and Indeglia disputed the majority’s 
assertion that Melendez-Diaz was a mere application of Crawford, 
recognizing that the scope of the Confrontation Clause remained 
unsettled and vigorously debated in the wake of Crawford.100 
The dissent moved on to cite Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
concerns that the Crawford approach exhibited “persistent 
ambiguities” which were “symptomatic of a rule not amenable to 
sensible applications.”101  This ambiguity had been exacerbated by 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. (Flaherty, J. and Indeglia, J., dissenting in part and concurring 
in result). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 1244 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 
(2004)).  
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 923 N.E.2d 524, 532 (Mass. 
2010)).  
 101.  Id. at 1245 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2726 
(2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).  
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the fact that, prior to Moten’s trial, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court had provided sparse clarification of Crawford.102  Justices 
Flaherty and Indeglia concluded with the following: 
Although it cannot reasonably be disputed that the 
exception to our “raise or waive” rule is indeed a narrow 
one, we maintain that the majority effectively reads this 
exception out of our jurisprudence. The line between a 
novel rule of law and the application of a rule of law in a 
new context can sometimes be blurry, if not 
indistinguishable. We acknowledge that this is a close 
call, but we cannot fault defense counsel for his failure to 
forecast Crawford’s application to the facts.103 
The dissent then moved on to explain why the ophthalmologist’s 
statements in this case were not testimonial.104 
While the majority in Moten was particularly stringent in its 
interpretation of the novel constitutional issue exception, such 
rigidity has not always been the standard.  In State v. Dennis, the 
appellant levied a due process challenge against Rhode Island 
General Laws section 11-37.1-15(a)(2), which allows the superior 
courts to determine the extent of witness production and cross 
examination necessary before a person is classified as a sex 
offender.105  The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the appellant had failed to raise the procedural due process 
objection to the statute at the superior court level, but chose to 
review the claim anyway.106  “Although we remain unconvinced 
that the right to procedural due process in the Superior Court 
amounts to a novel rule of constitutional law . . . we shall 
nonetheless address defendant’s claims.”107  It remains entirely 
unclear why the court—composed of the same five justices that 
decided Moten—agreed to rule on the merits of the appellant’s 
procedural due process claim in Dennis.  As the court recognized, 
the principles underlying procedural due process rights were far 
from novel—having been established by the United States 
 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 1246–48. 
 105.  29 A.3d 445, 449 (R.I. 2011). 
 106.  Id. at 449–50. 
 107.  Id. at 450. 
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Supreme Court in the 1970s.108  More importantly, the court had 
ruled, nearly two years earlier, on the extent to which procedural 
due process applies to section 11-37.1-15(a)(2).109  Accordingly, 
unlike in Moten, there was hardly an interstice in this area of 
Rhode Island’s constitutional jurisprudence.110 
An examination of the majority opinion in Moten (especially 
when juxtaposed with Dennis) reveals the subjective, 
unpredictable nature of Rhode Island’s raise or waive rule and, 
more specifically, its exception.  As the dissent in Moten 
recognized, the distinction between a truly novel rule and the 
mere application of an existing rule to new facts is tenuous at 
best.111  Was the United States Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in 
United States v. Jones—concluding that GPS tracking constitutes 
a search—a novel rule or an application of existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to a new set of facts?112  Was Roe v. 
Wade a novel constitutional rule113  or simply a new application of 
 
 108.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254 (1970).  
 109.  State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 578 (R.I. 2009).  
 110.  Compounding this confusion are the cases where the court has 
concluded that an issue was waived and yet proceeded to decide the merits 
anyway.  In State v. Figuereo, for example, the defendant argued that the 
trial justice committed reversible error by declining to give a certain jury 
instruction regarding eyewitness reliability.  31 A.3d 1283, 1288 (R.I. 2011).  
The court began by reciting its raise or waive rule, explaining that the 
defendant had not requested the particular instruction which she now 
claimed was required, and therefore, she had waived her right to argue in 
favor of said instruction.  Id. at 1289–90.  Nonetheless, the court chose to rule 
on the merits of the defendant’s argument, ultimately rejecting the claim.  Id. 
at 1290–91.  Furthermore, in State v. Delarosa, the court ruled on the merits 
of the defendant’s “right to allocution” argument despite observing that the 
defendant “may have waived the issue of his right to allocution because he 
did not indicate to the hearing justice that he wished to address the court.”  
39 A.3d 1043, 1052 n.17 (R.I. 2012).  These are cases where the court seemed 
to be bolstering its substantive decision by emphasizing that, even if one 
disagrees with its decision on the merits, the appellants’ arguments should be 
rejected because they were waived.  While the court is certainly permitted to 
provide alternative bases for a ruling, the virtue of judicial efficiency—so 
often cited to justify the harsh realities of the raise or waive doctrine—is 
impeded when the court decides to rule on the merits despite waiver of the 
argument.  
 111.  See State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1245 (R.I. 2013) (Flaherty, J. and 
Indeglia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result).  
 112.  132 S. Ct. 945, 952–54 (2012).   
 113.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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the right to privacy that the Court had discovered eight years 
earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut?114  In a legal system predicated 
on the incremental extension of existing jurisprudence, divining 
the precise moment of conception for a particular constitutional 
principle is a difficult proposition. 
Additionally, even if a constitutional principle can be 
classified as truly novel, what is the statute of limitations on 
novelty?  The majority in Moten determined that Crawford’s 
novelty had expired after two and a half years.115  That 
determination seems eminently reasonable; however, at what 
point in those two and a half years did the novelty actually expire?  
After the first year?  After the second year?  Moving forward, how 
do appellate litigators determine whether too much time has 
passed between the novel case and the underlying trial?  At some 
point, it probably becomes easier to simply require that the novel 
case actually intervene the trial and appeal as occurred in State v. 
Mendes and State v. Dufour.116  Simply put, the novelty standard 
results in a situation where both advocates as well as the court 
must expend significant resources while attempting to determine 
whether the appeal presents a novel issue or merely a novel 
application.  This, of course, occurs before any consideration of the 
underlying substantive question is addressed.117  All of this is in 
service of a rule which purportedly advances the efficient 
administration of justice. 
One final concern with the ambiguous exception is the conflict 
that can arise between the attorney’s duty to their client and the 
attorney’s duty of candor to the court.  In reviewing trial 
transcripts for error, appellate counsel will inevitably be 
confronted with potential preservation issues—whether the trial 
counsel failed to object at all or merely failed to articulate the 
proper basis for the objection (as was the case in Moten118).  
 
 114.  381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 115.  Moten, 64 A.3d at 1241. 
 116.  See State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50, 52–53 (R.I. 1965); State v. Dufour, 
206 A.2d 82, 83, 85, 87 (R.I. 1965). 
 117.  See Martineau, supra note 3, at 1032 (“Each time an appellant asks 
the appellate court to consider an issue not raised in the trial court, the 
appellate court must devote time to deciding whether to consider the issue 
and, if it decides to do so, must then spend additional time examining its 
merits.”). 
 118.  Moten, 64 A.3d 1239. 
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Arguably, affirmatively raising the defect in the topside brief is 
not in the appellant’s best interest.  However, Rule 3.3 of the 
Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct demands an 
attorney’s candor to the tribunal.  More specifically Rule 3.3(a)(2) 
states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to 
the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known 
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client 
and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”119  “The underlying 
concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to 
determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.”120 
In light of this conflict, many attorneys may endeavor to 
shoehorn an unpreserved argument into the novel constitutional 
rule exception, thereby justifying his or her choice not to 
affirmatively alert the court of the procedural defect.  The more 
ambiguous the exception, the more preservation defects counsel 
can, in good faith, justify not raising.  Certainly, the odds are low 
that such defects escape opposing counsel, the justices, and their 
law clerks; however, a good faith argument that the exception 
applied should spare the attorney from rebuke.121  While it may 
 
 119.  R.I. R. Prof. Conduct R. 3.3(a)(2).  
 120.  Id. R. 3.3, cmt. 3. 
 121.  The tension created between the appellate attorney’s duty to the 
client and his duty to the court with regards to preservation issues is far from 
conjecture: 
  Both [appellants] now complain that the eventual admission of 
the handguns into evidence violated the order excluding evidence not 
provided pursuant to discovery orders. Indeed, both claim that this 
issue is preserved by the trial court’s ruling on that motion.  
  It is very clear that after this Court’s review of the record that 
the motion to exclude evidence not provided pursuant to discovery 
orders was not aimed at the handguns; more importantly, it is clear 
that the trial court’s order granting this motion did not cover that 
evidence. That this could not be clearer is shown by the facts that a 
separate motion specifically addressed the handguns, that this 
motion was discussed just a moment before the discovery-order 
motion, and that the court separately ruled on this motion. In 
presenting their arguments as they have and ignoring the separate 
motions made at trial, it seems that appellate counsel either did not 
review the record very carefully or they have decided to push the 
boundaries of the duty of candor to a tribunal to its limits. [One of 
the two attorneys] at least, appears to have recognized that there 
were two different motions and rulings, but she argues that the trial 
court’s rulings were inconsistent and arbitrary. Because the motion 
to exclude evidence not provided under the discovery orders and the 
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be strategically beneficial for the attorney to raise the defect in the 
topside brief in an attempt to “take the sting out,”122 waiting to 
address the defect in the reply brief (assuming the opposing side 
identifies it) can be equally tempting.  Ultimately, this is an 
internal strategic debate that the law should aspire to 
eliminate.123  Both the advocates who rely upon the rule as well as 
the judges who must administer it would benefit from additional, 
objective guideposts for determining whether an unpreserved 
issue should be considered. 
III. THE FUTURE OF RAISE OR WAIVE 
Rhode Island’s raise or waive rule is neither a statutory 
mandate nor a constitutional imperative; it is a prudential 
limitation imposed on the court by the court.  Unlike personal 
jurisdiction or a statute of limitations, the court could abandon the 
doctrine (or its exception) tomorrow.  In that sense, raise or waive 
 
court’s resolution of this motion did not cover the guns, they cannot 
be deemed to have preserved this issue for appellate review.  
Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 88 (Ky. 2012) (second emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted).   
 122.   There are certainly benefits of affirmatively raising preservation 
defects for appellate courts.  See, e.g., Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 
S.W.2d 558, 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (“Defendant, although admitting with 
commendable candor that it has not preserved any allegation of error as to 
Instruction No. 7, insists that this court should consider its allegation . . . as 
constituting ‘plain error.’”); State v. Reid, 367 S.E.2d 672, 674 (N.C. 1988) 
(“[T]he defendant conceded with commendable candor that the objection at 
trial came too late and that this question was not properly preserved for 
appellate review.”).  However, such benefits rarely extend beyond mere 
compliment.  See, e.g., Landie, 390 S.W.2d at 568 (“[T]his is not a case 
wherein this court should exercise its discretion under [the plain error 
exception].”); Reid, 367 S.E.2d at 674 (“[W]e decline the defendant’s invitation 
to suspend the rules of appellate procedure.”).  
 123.  There are other strategic reasons why an attorney may raise an 
issue despite its obvious preservation defects.  The doctrine of cumulative 
error, for instance, recognizes that “at some point trial errors may combine so 
that together they operate to infect the trial fundamentally and thus violate 
the defendant’s due process rights.”  State v. Powers, 566 A.2d 1298, 1305 
(R.I. 1989).  The doctrine, first discussed in State v. Pepper, 237 A.2d 330 (R.I. 
1968), states that “[w]hile an error may not be prejudicial when examined in 
isolation, a series of errors may have a cumulative effect which supports 
reversal.”  State v. Roderick, 403 A.2d 1090, 1093 n.4 (R.I. 1979).  This 
appellate “Hail Mary” requires, as one might imagine, a substantial number 
of errors, and accordingly, an attorney relying on the doctrine may want to 
raise an unpreserved issue in an attempt to increase the aggregate. 
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is analogous to stare decisis.  Both are self-imposed restraints on 
the court’s clear authority to decide a legal issue.124  Both are 
historically rooted in the predictability of the law and the efficient 
administration of justice.125  However, with regards to stare 
decisis, the United States Supreme Court has candidly provided 
litigants and judges with particularized circumstances where the 
court may depart from the doctrine.126  Yet, in the realm of raise 
or waive, litigants have been left to struggle with the meaning of a 
“novel constitutional rule.”  
In 1982, the First Circuit decided United States v. Krynicki.127  
In Krynicki, the district court dismissed stolen gun charges under 
the Speedy Trial Act given that the indictment was returned more 
than thirty days after the defendant’s arrest.128  The government 
appealed and argued that, because the indictment charged the 
defendant with counts additional to those for which she was 
originally arrested, the additional counts should not have been 
dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act.129  The defendant rebutted 
that the government had not presented that argument to the 
district court on the motion to dismiss.130  Given that there was no 
transcript of the district court hearing, the First Circuit assumed 
that the government had indeed failed to raise the argument at 
 
 124.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is 
not an inexorable command; rather, it ‘is a principle of policy and not a 
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’” (quoting Helvering 
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).  
 125.  See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 312 (1983) (Burger, J., dissenting) 
(“While the doctrine of stare decisis does not absolutely bind the Court to its 
prior opinions, a decent regard for the orderly development of the law and the 
administration of justice requires that directly controlling cases be either 
followed or candidly overruled.”).  
 126.  In Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor recognized that, in deciding whether to abandon stare decisis, a 
court should consider: (1) whether the rule at issue has historically defied 
practical workability; (2) whether the rule has been detrimentally relied upon 
in a manner that removing it would result in inequitable circumstances; (3) 
whether related principles of law have developed in a manner to render the 
original rule “no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”; and (4) 
whether the facts surrounding the rule have so changed “as to have robbed 
the old rule of significant application or justification.”  505 U.S. 833, 854–55 
(1992).  
 127.  689 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 128.  Id. at 290–91.  
 129.  Id. at 291. 
 130.  Id. 
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the district court level.131 
The three judge panel, consisting of Judges Levin Campbell, 
Stephen Breyer, and Raymond Pettine (sitting by designation), 
began by reiterating that “[t]he ordinary rule is that appellate 
courts will not consider issues not raised below. . . . However, 
appellate courts do have discretion to examine issues raised for 
the first time on appeal.”132  The court identified four principles 
for determining whether an unpreserved issue falls within this 
exception: (1) whether the unpreserved issue is purely legal and 
no further development of the factual record is necessary to its 
resolution; (2) whether the party’s argument is “highly 
persuasive”; (3) whether the issue is almost certain to arise in 
future cases, and therefore, declining to decide the matter will 
hinder judicial economy and the fair administration of criminal 
justice; and (4) whether declining to reach the issue would 
constitute “a miscarriage of justice.”133  The court concluded that 
the government’s argument satisfied these principles and decided 
the issue on the merits, ultimately agreeing with the government 
and reversing the district court’s dismissal.134  The First Circuit 
has subsequently used the principles of Krynicki on multiple 
occasions to justify ruling on unpreserved arguments.135 
While the second and fourth principles set out in Krynicki are 
admittedly no more concrete than the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court’s current jurisprudence, the first and third principles are 
objective, sensible criteria which would give appellate advocates 
more guidance as to whether an unpreserved argument will be 
heard on the merits. 
One of the primary concerns underlying the raise or waive 
rule is that an appellate court’s knowledge of the case is strictly 
limited to the trial record.136  Continually remanding matters to 
the trial courts for further factual findings on unpreserved issues 
would be an enormously unwieldy procedure.  Accordingly, 
 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. at 291–92.  
 134.  Id. at 295.  
 135.  See, e.g., United States v. Patrick V., 359 F.3d 3, 8 & n.2 (1st Cir. 
2004); Castillo v. Matesanz, 348 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. 
La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1012–13 (1st Cir. 1990).  
 136.  See Martineau, supra note 3, at 1038. 
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Krynicki’s first criterion—requiring that the unpreserved issue be 
purely legal with no further factual development required—is a 
logical limitation on the exception to raise or waive.137  Appellate 
consideration of such unpreserved, purely legal issues does not 
deprive the opposing party “of an opportunity to introduce 
relevant evidence.”138 
Yet and still, whether appellate courts are equipped to 
determine if additional evidence is necessary to resolve an 
unpreserved, legal issue has been questioned.139  To some, the 
suggestion that “an appellate court can look at the record and 
conclude that no additional, relevant evidence could have been 
introduced on a completely new legal issue had the parties known 
it would be decisive in the case simply flies in the face of what we 
know about the trial process.”140  For example, one wonders 
whether Moten would have met this criterion.  While the dissent 
felt confident in deciding that the ophthalmologist’s statements 
were not testimonial based on the existing record,141 certainly 
additional evidence regarding the precise purpose for the 
statements as well as the reason why the ophthalmologist was 
unavailable would have been helpful. On the other hand, analysis 
under Krynicki’s first criterion would be very similar to 
determining whether an issue is a question of fact, a question of 
law, or a mixed question of fact and law—an analysis that the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court performs on a regular basis.142  If 
the court concludes that the appellant’s unpreserved argument 
implicates unresolved questions of fact, then the preservation 
defect should not be excused and the merits should not be 
considered. 
However, if the issue is a purely legal question requiring no 
additional facts, the matter should next be reviewed in light of 
Krynicki’s third criterion.  This criterion—requiring an issue that 
is almost certain to arise again—permits the court to carefully 
 
 137.  See Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 291–92. 
 138.  Id. at 292. 
 139.  See Martineau, supra note 3, at 1038.  
 140.  Id. at 1037.  
 141.  See State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1245–48 (R.I. 2013) (Flaherty, J. 
and Indeglia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result).  
 142.  See, e.g., Banville v. Brennan, 84 A.3d 424, 431 (R.I. 2014); Tedesco 
v. Connors, 871 A.2d 920, 924–25 (R.I. 2005); Robitaille v. Brousseau, 339 
A.2d 738, 741 (R.I. 1975).  
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select only those unpreserved arguments that will save parties 
confusion on the same issues in future cases.143  “[D]eclining to 
reach [a] straight-forward legal issue will neither promote judicial 
economy, nor aid the administration of the criminal justice 
system.”144  Recall that the dissent in Moten emphasized the fact 
that the Rhode Island Supreme Court (prior to Moten’s trial) had 
“provided little guidance on the application of Crawford.”145  If the 
unpreserved issue is likely to arise in future cases, the court 
should exercise its discretion in favor of eliminating future 
confusion. 
The criticism of this criterion is that if “[t]here is every 
likelihood that the issue will be raised properly in future cases . . . 
the court will be able to rule on the issue without making an 
exception to the general rule.”146  This criticism, of course, ignores 
the harm done to the litigant in the pending appeal and assumes 
that the trial counsel in the next case will properly raise the 
argument without any further guidance from the appellate 
court.147  The great benefit of this criterion is that it impliedly 
 
 143.  Kyrnicki, 689 F.2d at 292; see also United States v. Golon, 511 F.2d 
298, 301 (1st Cir. 1975) (“[W]e are loath to pass over a question, squarely 
before us, which is almost certain to be presented in identical terms in other 
cases.”).  
 144.  Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292.  In United States v. Patrick V., the First 
Circuit, citing Krynicki, stressed that: 
[B]ecause this legal question is likely to arise in other cases—all the 
more likely because of the paucity of case law regarding federal 
juvenile dispositions in general and restitution in particular—
declining to hear the issue will neither promote judicial economy nor 
aid in the administration of the juvenile justice system.  
359 F.3d 3, 8 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292).  
 145.  Moten, 64 A.3d at 1245 (Flaherty, J. and Indeglia, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in result).  The dissent cited State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 
631, 642 (R.I. 2006) and State v. Harris, 871 A.2d 341, 345 n.12 (R.I. 2005) as 
cases wherein the court had set aside for another day the task of clarifying 
the contours of Crawford.  Moten, 64 A.3d at 1245. 
 146.  Martineau, supra note 3, at 1041. 
 147.  For example, nine years before the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
rejected the defendant’s unpreserved Confrontation Clause argument in 
Moten, it did the same in State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1039–40 (R.I. 2004).  
In Lynch, the defendant argued that the introduction of extrajudicial 
statements made by a witness to a police officer violated the Confrontation 
Clause.  Id. at 1036.  As in Moten, trial counsel in Lynch limited his objection 
to the hearsay rules, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that 
the Confrontation Clause argument was unpreserved.  Id. at 1039.  The court 
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embodies the “novelty” standard without explicitly requiring it.  
Reaching an unpreserved legal issue that has already been 
addressed by the courts on previous occasions would neither 
promote judicial economy nor aid the administration of the justice 
system.  Therefore, the court may continue to consider novelty, 
but not be bound by it. 
Far from a cure-all, Krynicki provides a modest clarification 
for appellate advocates and judges alike.  Certainly, other 
paradigms abound,148 and therefore, Krynicki is not trumpeted as 
the solution, but rather a solution—a humble alternative—to the 
current “novel constitutional rule” regime. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Simply put, the fact that the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
justices in Moten spent twelve well-researched, well-written pages 
debating the precise contours of an exception (that has existed for 
nearly fifty years) to a rule (that has existed for twice that long) 
tends to negate any claim that the doctrine faithfully serves 
judicial economy.  Hopefully, at this point of the Article, it is clear 
that its intended purpose is neither to intentionally increase nor 
decrease the overall amount of unpreserved issues considered by 
the court.  A stark increase, given Rhode Island’s limited appellate 
resources, would seriously detriment the speedy administration of 
justice in the state, while a stark decrease would frankly be 
impossible given the few unpreserved arguments that the court 
currently agrees to consider.  The purpose of the Article is to 
merely suggest a modest alternative to the current novel 
constitutional rule exception.  The purpose is to allow attorneys to 
 
also rejected the defendant’s attempts to fit within the novel constitutional 
rule exception because any error was harmless.  Id. at 1040.   
 148.  Connecticut appellate courts, for example, require the following 
elements before agreeing to consider unpreserved arguments on appeal:  
[W]e hold that a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional 
error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are 
met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; 
(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a 
fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly 
exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if 
subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to 
demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823, 827 (Conn. 1989) (footnote omitted).   
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spend less time considering whether to devote precious pages in 
their appellate briefs (and minutes at oral argument) on an 
unpreserved issue if the court does not intend to excuse the defect.  
The actual raise or waive rule—requiring an objection be made at 
trial to preserve the argument for appeal—is fairly simple to 
understand and easy to apply; one hopes that, at some point, its 
exception will follow suit. 
 
